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Executive Summary
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
was the first of its kind, and its achievement in generating political will and momentum for
efforts to control small arms light weapons (SALW) is important. Although many of the
commitments agreed in its Programme of Action (PoA) are less comprehensive than hoped
for, it is clear that the UN Small Arms Conference has contributed to a better understanding of
the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of different
countries and sub-regions. Furthermore, while the PoAprovides a set of minimum standards
and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages further action from all
States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and comprehensive programmes. The UN
Small Arms Conference process also demonstrated a willingness amongst a number of
States to build upon the PoA and take more concrete and far-reaching measures at national,
sub-regional and regional levels.
The Biting the Bullet (BtB) project published thirteen briefings on issues that were addressed
in the final PoA. The extent to which the recommendations put forward by the BtB project
were adopted, varies from issue to issue. However, the PoAincludes important commitments
with regard to the reduction of surplus small arms stocks, requiring States to regularly review
their stocks and to establish programmes for the responsible disposal of surplus weapons,
preferably through destruction. The PoAalso establishes clear international norms and
encourages programmes to promote secure stockpile management for SALW as well as
provisions relating to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.
Although the UN Small Arms Conference could not agree on the establishment of a set of
internationally accepted export criteria which would enhance controls on legal transfers, the
PoAdoes contain an important commitment requiring States to authorise exports of SALW on
the basis of strict national export criteria that are consistent with States existing obligations
under international law. It also explicitly calls on States to cooperate with the enforcement of
UN Security Council arms embargoes.
In other areas, the UN Small Arms Conference achievements were more mixed. Consensus
could not be reached on the need to establish an international mechanism to trace SALW
lines of supply, with a recommendation that a UN study be undertaken to examine the
feasibility of developing an international instrument in this regard alongside a number of
politically-binding national commitments on marking, record-keeping and tracing of SALW.
Although the PoA does not include a commitment to negotiate an international legally binding
instrument to control arms brokering and transportation, it makes a number of
recommendations for the adoption of national controls – including registration of arms brokers
and licensing of individual transactions – and it requires States to consider international co-
operation on this issue. Whilst the final PoAcontains a number of measures to regulate the
trade in SALW, more specificity would have been useful in the definition of what constitutes
“adequate laws and regulations”, as well as greater detail on the type of information that
should be included in licensing and authorisation procedures. At the same time, the PoA
contains a major flaw in its assertion of “the right of States to re-export small arms and light
weapons.” Whilst it is unclear from where this “right” derives a number of States expressly
forbid the unauthorised re-exportation of arms and security equipment which they have
originally exported.
There remain a number of issues that were not adequately addressed in the UN Small Arms
Conference final PoA. The failure of the international governmental community as a whole to
recognise the dangers resulting from the spread and inadequate control of SALW through
licensed production overseas is unfortunately reflected, through its absence, in the final PoA.
The issue of information exchange and transparency in arms control remained controversial 
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Executive Summary
throughout the conference with a small group of States opposed to the inclusion of specific
language on transparency measures. Without systematic information exchange and
consultation, however, effective implementation of a number of the provisions within the PoA
must be thrown into doubt. Whilst the PoA endorsed and encouraged weapons collection it
did not go beyond this to recommend or establish any specific programme or mechanisms to
promote implementation and it lacks a clear commitment by States to ensure that seized or
collected SALW are destroyed, with the possibility that “another form of disposition or use”
may be “officially authorised”. Finally, despite a number of assertions outlining the potential
contribution of civil society in combating the problems associated with SALW, the PoA
remains very much State-oriented.
Proposals for a system of both UN and ad hoc mechanisms to implement the PoAwere
mooted in the first draft PoA (A/Conf.192/L.4). These met with  opposition from several
quarters with concerns, in particular, over the role of existing UN departments and agencies
and regarding the issue of resources. As a result, in the final agreed PoA, most of the
operational implementation of the PoAis left to States, which may voluntarily report to the UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs on progress made. Specifically, the PoAprovides for a
Review Conference no later than 2006 and Biennial Meetings of States to consider national,
regional and global implementation of the PoA.
BtB is clear on the need for concrete, measurable mechanisms to control and monitor the
proliferation of and the illicit trade in SALW being agreed in the coming years, with the
development of such mechanisms linked to the Biennial Meetings of States. In the first BtB
briefing, issues were identified where it was judged there was greater potential for agreement
by the time of a Review Conference and so BtB urges individual States or groups of States to
take the lead in ensuring that progress is made in developing and implementing the
provisions of the PoA in each of these areas. The Biennial Meetings and Review Conference
represent crucial opportunities to assess progress in addressing these issues and for
encouraging action on the part of more reluctant States that are falling or lagging behind.
The UN Small Arms Conference PoAmakes only minimal provision for funding of activities for
its implementation. The UN is required to fund the feasibility study on tracing and to use
available resources to circulate information provided by States on implementation of the PoA
on an annual basis. Beyond these sparse provisions, the implementation of the PoArests on
voluntary funding, either through the UN and its agencies, for example the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), or through individual countries or regional organisations. 
In view of the myriad of challenges facing governments seeking to control the proliferation of
and illicit trade in SALW at national, regional and global levels, a major increase in available
funding will be required from all states and organisations in a position to contribute. Whilst
many governments have modest budget lines dedicated to addressing small arms
proliferation, the scale of the SALW problem will undoubtedly require accessing the more
substantial funds located within security, defence and development budgets of more affluent
States.
In this context, BtB believes that there are three main tasks in enhancing international
assistance in implementing the PoA:
l identifying the needs and priorities for assistance;
l mobilising resources for effective international assistance; and
l matching identified needs with resources available for assistance.
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The PoAagreed at the UN Small Arms Conference provides a key set of agreed principles,
commitments and programmes that all participating States should implement. Clearly,
different States and regional groupings will implement these according to their own situations
and capabilities. However, even in the months since the conclusion of the UN Small Arms
Conference a number of encouraging regional initiatives to tackle SALW proliferation,
availability and misuse have begun to develop. The diverse problems associated with small
arms ensure, however, that any effective solution requires a multi-sectoral approach. The UN
Special Session on Children will be an important opportunity to highlight the impacts of small
arms on children as well as to develop a strong international response that builds upon the
outcomes of the UN Small Arms Conference. While multilateral efforts to curb small arms
proliferation, availability and misuse are still relatively new and untested, the negotiation of the
UN Protocol against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition is a positive development.
Acrucial element required for effective implementation of the UN Small Arms PoAis the
establishment of a mechanism for systematic exchange of information and experience
between regional, sub-regional and international bodies involved in efforts to prevent and
reduce SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. In order to develop a process of thorough
monitoring, the BtB project is seeking to work with a wide variety of partners to develop
substantial Biennial and Review Conference Reports on progress made by States in the
implementation of key elements of the PoA. BtB will also seek to promote international
implementation of key commitments in the PoA through the convening of informal Expert
Groups to explore issues that are considered ripe for action. There are a number of key areas
where NGOs and civil society can make a vital contribution towards successful
implementation of the PoA and in combating SALW proliferation and misuse. In these
activities the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is in a position to play a
pivotal coordinating role.
Outcomes and
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Historically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in
commitments to real change, which is also a charge that has been levelled against the UN
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small
Arms Conference). The consensus-based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had
the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of
Action (PoA), but it also ensured that it would be difficult to achieve a sufficiently rigorous and
comprehensive agreement on all of the measures required to tackle the trafficking,
proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Therefore, in spite of the
efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not agree
sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive
process. The resulting PoAincludes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and
commitments, which provide a basis for taking forward action at national, regional and global
levels. The PoAwas agreed by all of the participating States, amounting to more than 100,
and each are politically bound to adopt and implement it. 
Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in
generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is important. Although
many of the commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many
governments and organisations, it is significant that the PoAcontains at least some important
commitments in all but two of the ‘core’ issue areas raised by States. The two exceptions
relate to transfers to non-State actors and to civilian trade, possession and use of SALW,
restrictions which were strongly opposed by the USA. Equally, human rights related issues
were noteworthy by their absence in the PoA.
Whilst the process of reaching agreement began with a far-reaching draft PoA in December
2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most of the comments that were tabled on this text during the second
Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries that sought to weaken its
commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, with the
result that progressive States faced an uphill task in seeking to strengthen its provisions. 
The next draft PoA emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself in the form of a third draft
(A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in a number of key areas – such as export criteria and
transparency – this document went further than L.4/Rev.1 in a number of respects and included
specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. This,
h o w e v e r, proved too ambitious an agenda for a small group of States and in the end the document
that was adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower-level compromise.
Despite the difficulties of agreeing the consensus-based PoA, the process culminating in the
agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. UN Small Arms Conference
represented the first time that all UN Member States had met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW
in all its aspects with a view to agreeing a comprehensive set of measures to address the
problem. Although many of the commitments contained in the PoAare couched in equivocal
language that will allow States to do as much or as little as they like, it is clear that the UN Small
Arms Conference has contributed to a much better understanding, amongst all stakeholders, of
the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of diff e r e n t
countries and sub-regions. It is also clear that although the Programme of Action provides a set
of minimum standards and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages
further action from all States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger
programmes. There is a willingness among a number of States to build upon the PoAand take
more concrete and far-reaching measures at national, sub-regional, regional and international
levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing co-operation, or mechanisms to co-ordinate
e fforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. 
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This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms
Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those
that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions, and suggests ways to
put the commitments contained in the PoA into practice. Section 2 assesses the
implementation and follow-up commitments contained in the PoA, and identifies ways of
promoting the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for making the most of
the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference in 2006. Section 3 examines
funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA including identifying needs, mobilising
resources and matching needs with resources. The final section of the briefing focuses on the
way forward, and in particular on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing
regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW
proliferation, availability and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the
illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be taken forward at sub-regional and regional levels
in conjunction with all major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to
the first Review Conference. 
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Section 1: Review of the UN Small Arms Conference
and Programme of Action 
The BtB project published thirteen briefings that presented a range of outcomes for the UN
PoA on many issues that were contained in the final programme.1 This section assesses the
degree to which key outcomes were achieved, and suggests ways of building on the results
contained in the PoA. In particular, it focuses on the issues that have been identified as most
important and necessitating collaborative, global responses. These areas are: 
l Marking, record-keeping and tracing
l Brokering
l Licensing and end use controls
l Manufacture and licensed production overseas
l Enhancing controls on legal transfers
l Information exchange and transparency 
l Weapons collection
l Weapons destruction and reducing surplus arms stocks 
l Stockpile security 
l Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
l Role of civil society
l Regional initiatives
These issues are examined in the context of the nature of the problem and possible
responses, recommendations made by the BtB project, how these issues were treated in the
PoA, and ways forward for optimising the implementation of the provisions within the PoA.
The importance of enhancing the ‘traceability’ of flows of SALW had become widely
recognised by the time of the first PrepCom for the UN Small Arms Conference in early 2000.
The capacity to trace sources and lines of supply of illicit or destabilising SALW was
considered by many as necessary for States to identify points of diversion of authorised
stocks or shipments into illicit networks and thus to take corrective action. It was also
supported in order to promote awareness and accountability in arms transfers to deter
irresponsible or destabilising transfers, and thus limit the ‘grey market’ trading that is so
central to the processes of small arms proliferation and subsequent availability and misuse. It
was widely hoped that the PoA would establish clear and adequate international standards for
marking, record-keeping and co-operation in tracing of SALW and launch the development of
an effective regime for tracing illicit or destabilising sources and flows of such weapons. 
The BtB project consistently argued that the PoA should include not only strong national
commitments on marking, record-keeping and tracing but also launch negotiations for a
detailed and binding international instrument to enhance cooperation to identify and trace
lines of supply of SALW of concern. In the end, consensus could not be achieved to launch
international negotiations to establish a tracing mechanism, and the PoAlimits itself to a
number of politically-binding commitments. At the national level, it declares in Section II,
paragraph 7, that States are committed: “To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers
apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral
part of the production process… identifying the country of manufacture and also provide
information that enables the national authorities… to identify the manufacturer and serial
number.” 2 Therefore, States must “adopt where they do not exist and enforce all the
necessary measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any
unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons” (Section II, paragraph 8).3
In Section II, paragraph 9, the PoA calls on States: “To ensure that comprehensive and 
Marking,
record-keeping
and tracing
7
Section 1: Review of the UN Small Arms Conference
and Programme of Action 
accurate records are kept on the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light
weapons… These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure
that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated.” 4 It further calls on States to
take “effective measures for tracing… weapons” held and issued by the State (Section II,
paragraph 10).5 At the global level, there is an undertaking to “strengthen the ability of States
to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and
light weapons” (Section II, paragraph 36).6
To promote implementation of these international standards, Section III of the PoAestablishes
that States and regional and international organisations should: 
l provide capacity-building assistance, on request, for tracing and marking (paragraph 6)7:
l co-operate and assist in examining technologies to improve tracing and detection of illicit
trade in SALW and facilitate technology transfer (paragraph 10)8; 
l undertake to co-operate with each other in tracing illicit SALW, particularly by
strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information (paragraph 11 )9;
and
l exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national marking systems
(paragraph 12) 1 0.
These are strong commitments. They complement and reinforce obligations contained in the
recently-agreed UN Firearms Protocol, which legally commits participating States to clear
standards of marking and record-keeping of firearms, and to cooperate in tracing firearms
associated with transnational crime and criminal trafficking.11 What is most lacking now is a
clear international mechanism for cooperation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW,
particularly weapons that have been discovered in unauthorised possession or shipments
associated with regions of conflict or human rights crises.12 This mechanism would clarify
procedures and rules for cooperation in this politically sensitive area, and properly establish
capacity building and other systems to facilitate marking and tracing efforts. 
During the preparations for the UN Small Arms Conference, France and Switzerland sought to
build support for a proposal to establish such an international tracing mechanism for SALW of
concern.13 Despite wide interest in and support for their efforts, proposals to establish
negotiations to develop this mechanism were blocked by a group of States (including China,
the USAand the Arab League) which were opposed to launching follow-on negotiations for
legally-binding agreements in any area. 
As a weak compromise, the PoArecommends that the UN General Assembly undertake a UN
Study to examine the feasibility of developing such an instrument (Section IV, paragraph
1(c)).14 United Nations General Assembly draft resolution L.47, agreed during the First
Committee in October 2001, adopts this recommendation, and requests the study be
submitted to its 58th session in 2003.15 This at least keeps the process alive within the UN
system even if it postpones serious negotiation on an issue that is probably already ‘ripe’ for
international agreement. 
The immediate challenge is to promote implementation of all of the commitments relating to
this issue contained in the PoA, which should start immediately. Moreover, an international
‘coalition of willing’ States should quickly agree to participate in a politically-binding tracing
arrangement. This would establish the process of tracing cooperation and provide valuable
experience in preparation for the time when an international agreement can be negotiated
within a UN framework. The launch of such an arrangement would be diplomatically delicate,
but support for cooperation in tracing is probably already sufficiently wide and strong to make
it realistic.
Marking,
record-keeping
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Recent UN and non-governmental studies have shown that arms brokering and transport
agents play a significant role in the illicit small arms trade. Recognising this fact, BtB argued
that reaching international agreement on the control of arms brokering and transport agents
was one of the most important challenges facing the UN Small Arms Conference. BtB further
argued that effective action to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in SALW by arms brokering
and transportation agents would require a comprehensive international agreement,
encompassing registration and licensing of arms brokering agents at the national level and
provisions for international information exchange and cooperation on enforcement. BtB also
argued that the very serious consequences of unregulated arms brokering and transportation
necessitates the adoption by States of extra-territorial legislation in the same vein as has
been agreed under the terms of international conventions to prohibit chemical weapons and
land-mines. 
With specific reference to the UN Small Arms Conference PoA, BtB urged States to commit to
the negotiation of a legally binding international convention for the control of arms brokering
and transportation by 2003. However, in the event that such agreement proved impossible to
reach, BtB advocated a series of relevant associated measures, which would facilitate the
establishment of an international regime for the control of arms brokering and transportation
agents. These included: 
l explicit acknowledgement that unregulated arms brokering and transportation is a problem
that needs to be addressed; 
l an undertaking that, by the time of the first Biennial Meeting of States in 2003, there be a
review of progress towards achieving a common understanding of the nature and extent of
the problem; 
l an undertaking to develop model regulations for the control of arms brokering, also by the
first Biennial Meeting; 
l agreement to establish a mechanism whereby States can learn from each others’
experience in controlling arms brokering; and 
l a commitment to provide assistance to countries seeking to take action in this area. 
Finally, BtB argued that to be truly effective in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in
conventional arms, these measures would need to be backed up by effective controls on arms
exports (for example, through effective control and monitoring of end-use, and agreement on
strict criteria governing exports of SALW based on States’ existing responsibilities under
international law).
The PoA recognises that arms brokering is an international problem that requires an
international solution. The primary reference to the control of arms brokering in Section II,
paragraph 14, requires States: “To develop adequate national legislation or administrative
procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in SALW brokering. This legislation
or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or
authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit
brokering activities performed within the State’s jurisdiction and control.” 16 These
commitments are similar in scope to, though slightly stronger than, those set out in the UN
Firearms Protocol.17 The Firearms Protocol merely requires States to consider adopting such
measures whilst the PoA asserts that States should adopt measures such as registration and
licensing. This more concrete statement suggests that the international governmental
community’s commitment is strengthening in this field. 
Brokering
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The PoAalso contains a reference in Section II, paragraph 39, to the need “to develop
common understandings of the basic issues and scope of the problems related to illicit
brokering in small arms and light weapons.” 18 However, in view of the significant body of
information that now exists relating to arms brokering and transportation, it is to be hoped that
this process can be completed fairly quickly and the common understandings articulated by
the time of the first Biennial Meeting. Encouragingly, in the final Section of the PoA, Section
IV, paragraph 1(d), States undertake to “consider further steps to enhance international co-
operation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light
weapons.” 19 Although this falls short of a commitment to negotiate an international legally
binding instrument to control arms brokering and transportation, it does leave the way open
for States to pursue such an initiative. Indeed, if all of those States that are committed to
action in this area (such as the EU Member States) implement the registration and licensing
provisions outlined in the PoA, it is to be hoped that, by the time of the Review Conference in
2006, sufficient momentum will have been generated towards the development of an
international agreement. In order to facilitate this process, those States that have experience
of developing and enforcing legislation in this area should provide assistance and advice to
those wishing to do likewise. 
Developing effective national, regional and international controls on SALW export licensing and
end use are crucial elements in ensuring that this trade remains under government control
and is not diverted to illicit markets or end users. The UN Small Arms Conference provided an
important opportunity to develop such controls, building on the agreements in the UN
Firearms Protocol, as well as other international and regional measures, such as those in the
OSCE Document on SALW and those adopted by Wassenaar Arrangement Member States. 
BtB urged that the PoA include a commitment to develop and elaborate model regulations for
licensing and best practice in end-use certification and monitoring, ideally by the first Biennial
Meeting of States, and at the latest by the time of the Review Conference in 2006. BtB
recommended that these model regulations should build on national best practice, as well as
that developed and agreed regionally, specifically the Model Regulations adopted by the
Organisation of American States (OAS). BtB further recommended that such model
regulations include detailed certification procedures on the export and import of firearms and
ammunition, in terms of both licensing authorisations and end-use undertakings. Information
required for each process is summarised in the table below.
Licensing/Authorisation End-use
Place and date of issuance of licence 3
Date of expiration 3
Name of exporter; country of export 3 3
Details of intermediate and final consignees 3 3
Modes of transportation 3 3
Country of import 3 3
Final recipient 3 3
Description and quantity of firearms, parts, components and ammunition 3 3
Description of end-use 3 3
List of proscribed end-uses 3 3
Requirement not to re-export without prior authorisation 3
Brokering
Licensing 
and end use
controls
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BtB further urged that these transfer and end-use controls should apply to all classes of small
arms and light weapons and extend to State-to-State transfers, building on agreements on the
commercial trade in firearms contained in the UN Firearms Protocol. BtB recommended that
in cases where the diversion or misuse of SALW is uncovered, States should give serious
consideration to withholding further exports of military and security equipment until the factors
behind the diversion or misuse are addressed. 
The final PoA does contain a number of measures to regulate the trade in SALW. Section II,
Paragraph 11, declares that States should: “…establish or maintain an effective national system
of export and import licensing or authorisation, as well as measures on international transit,
for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in
small arms and light weapons.” 20 Furthermore, in Section II, paragraph 12, States commit to
“put in place… adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure the eff e c t i v e
control over the transfer of small arms and light weapons, including the use of authenticated
end-user certificates, and effective legal and enforcement measures.” 21 Whilst this paragraph
sets important markers for action by States, more specificity on what adequate laws and
regulations are, as well as detail on the type of information that should be included in licensing
and authorisation procedures needs to be developed. International agreement on the type,
quality and amount of information to be provided on licenses and authorisations would assist
not only in the development of future legally binding agreements on issues such as tracing,
but would also improve controls over the legal trade in SALW and reduce the likelihood of
SALW being diverted or used for purposes contrary to those for which the license was issued.
The development of such controls should be a priority for the Biennial Meetings of States.
The above developments are to be welcomed. However, the PoAdoes contain a major flaw
detailed in Section II, paragraph 13. This declares that States should “make every effort, in
accordance with national laws and practices, without prejudice to the right of States to re-export
small arms and light weapons that they have previously imported, to notify the original exporting
State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.” 22
It is unclear from where “the right of States to reexport small arms and light weapons” derives.
Anumber of leading manufacturers specifically prohibit re-export without prior authorisation
from the original exporting State. Furthermore, such a requirement is in line with best practice
and the procedures set out in the indicative list of end-use assurances in the Wassenaar
Arrangement. It is hoped that the development of a norm prohibiting “reexport without -
consent” can be established prior to, and reaffirmed during, the Review Conference in 2006.
Finally, Section II, paragraph 27, of the PoAincludes reference to developing appropriate
regional and sub-regional measures to enhance information sharing and trans-border
customs cooperation in combating the illicit trade in SALW across borders. BtB believes this
should now be built upon to include measures for the exchange of information on the risks of
diversion or misuse of SALW. Hopefully, a norm encouraging information exchange,
consultation, and consent before reexport can be established by the time of the Review
Conference in 2006. 
Although it proved impossible to agree on the elaboration of norms and standards in these
areas within the PoA itself, the document does, at the very minimum, provide the basis for the
establishment of a forum whereby international best practice can be identified and elaborated
upon. This should further provide a basis for model regulations and the establishment of an
international instrument regulating the manufacture, licensing and end-use of SALW. Only
through such harmonisation of measures at the international level will the preventive efforts
necessary to stem the proliferation and misuse of SALW in this area be successful.
Licensing 
and end use
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Comprehensive and stringently enforced licensing systems controlling manufacture of small
arms and light weapons are a crucial element in combating the illicit trade. An increasingly
important element of SALW manufacture is licensed production overseas – the practice where
one company allows and enables a second company in another country to manufacture its
products under license. Licensed production – and the concomitant transfer of arms production
technology and expertise – has become a major factor behind the steady increase in the
number of companies and countries that manufacture SALW. At present it is inadequately
controlled in many countries.
BtB urged governments to commit themselves in the PoA to developing regulatory
mechanisms that would adequately address current trends in SALW manufacturing and begin
to control licensed production. BtB recommended that the PoAcontain the following:
l Recognition that the inadequate regulation of licensed production agreements contributes
to the spread and misuse of SALW and is a problem that needs to be urgently addressed
by the international community;
l At the national level, States should establish control mechanisms requiring prior licensing
approval from companies seeking to establish licensed production facilities overseas. The
criteria for such government authorisation, and the end use control systems should be as
stringent as for direct SALW exports; and
l Acommitment by States to review, at the first Biennial Meeting, national approaches to
controlling licensed production with a view to establishing best practice and developing
effective national, regional and international controls.
Unfortunately the failure of the international governmental community as a whole to recognise
the dangers resulting from the spread and inadequate control of SALW through licensed
production is reflected in the final PoA, which contains no specific reference to controlling
licensed production arrangements.
There are, however, sections of the PoAthat deal with illicit manufacture that could be applied
or adapted to aid the control of licensed production arrangements. Section II, paragraph 2,
requires States to put in place “adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to
exercise effective control over the production… export, import, transit or retransfer of
[SALW]”23 in order to prevent unauthorised manufacture of and illicit trafficking in these
weapons. Furthermore, in Section II, paragraph 3, States are required “to ensure that those
engaged in such [illicit] activities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal
codes.” 24 Additionally Section II, paragraph 9, requires States to ensure “comprehensive and
accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the manufacture, holding and transfer of
SALW under their jurisdiction.” 25
These paragraphs are important provisions, crucial for effective State control of SALW
manufacture, and form a solid basis on which further national and international controls can
be built. They should be applied to all forms of SALW manufacture including licensed
production overseas. The application of such controls to licensed production overseas,
together with a process for future consultation, information exchange and development of
best practice provide a solid framework for States to address the current trends in SALW
manufacture.
Manufacture
and licensed
production
overseas
12
Section 1: Review of the UN Small Arms Conference
and Programme of Action 
There is extensive evidence that many of the weapons circulating in the illicit market originate
as government authorised, or legally transferred, weapons. An essential element of efforts to
combat illicit trafficking must therefore be control of the so-called legal trade to prevent
diversion to unauthorised end-users. Some governments have restrictively defined the illicit
trade as those international transactions that are not authorised by either one or both States
concerned in the transfers. Whilst such transfers are clearly illicit, the UN Disarmament
Commission (UNDC) articulated a wider global definition of the illicit trade in SALW, defining
the illicit arms trade as “…that international trade in conventional arms, which is contrary to
the laws of States and/or international law”.26
International law specifies a number of direct prohibitions on the transfers of arms. These can
take the form of UN arms embargoes and trade sanctions, which impose a ban on the export
of some or all categories of arms to particular end-users, or controls on specific types of
weapons whose effects are deemed inhumane or excessively injurious. International law also
curtails States’ freedom to authorise transfers with restrictions primarily dependent upon the
use being made of the weapons. Accordingly States should not transfer arms which they
know could be used to violate the following principles: the prohibition on the threat or use of
force; non-intervention in internal affairs of other States; preventing terrorism; international
humanitarian law; human rights law and standards; and preventing genocide.
BtB called for the UN Small Arms Conference to elaborate upon each of the above
international law principles, with a view to arriving at a common understanding amongst all
State Parties of the consequences of these principles for the regulation of SALW transfers.
BtB further called on the UN Small Arms Conference to agree upon a comprehensive set of
legal, administrative and practical measures to ensure that the elaborated norms and
standards are enforced rigorously by all States. 
In order to ensure consistent application and progressive development of the above norms
and standards and associated legal and administrative measures, BtB recommended that the
UN Small Arms Conference agree the establishment of an international mechanism in order
to conduct an annual review of the application of the norms and standards based on
information on SALW transfers provided by all States Parties. Furthermore, BtB argued that
the progressive development of elaborated international norms and standards should be
included in the Review Conference, which should also explore the development of a legally
binding international agreement on the regulation of SALW.
Although the UN Small Arms Conference could not agree on the establishment of a set of
internationally accepted export criteria, the PoAdoes contain a specific reference to export
criteria, linking them to international law. Under Section II, paragraph 11, States are called on:
“To assess applications for export authorisations according to strict national regulations and
procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with States’
existing responsibilities under relevant international law, taking into account, in particular, the
risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade.”27
This is an important commitment that should now be built upon. The international community
should now, therefore, develop a process whereby States can arrive at a common
understanding of what their “existing responsibilities under relevant international law” are in
regard to the trade in SALW. This process could also explore the feasibility of developing a
legally binding international agreement on the regulation of SALW transfers, based upon
applicable international law standards. During the UN preparatory process, a grouping of
NGOs led by the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, working with international
lawyers and supported by a commission of 19 Nobel Peace Prize laureates, launched a draft 
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Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers which attempts to codify States’
existing obligations under international law with regards to conventional arms transfers.28
This framework could be used in the development of a legally binding international agreement. 
Finally, one very important area where the UN Small Arms Conference did reach agreement
was with regard to UN Security Council arms embargoes. In both the national and
international sections of the PoA, there are explicit calls on States to cooperate with the
enforcement of UNSC arms embargoes. Section II, paragraph 15, declares that States
undertake to “take appropriate measures including all legal or administrative means, against
any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo.” 29 Although such
statements leave no room for ambiguity, the international community must now ensure that
they are fully enforced and that those who breach such embargoes are duly sanctioned.
Many provisions of the PoA would benefit from regular, coordinated information exchange.
However, the issue of information exchange and transparency in arms control is a difficult
issue for States to agree in the context of the UN, and remained controversial throughout the
conference – the US, China and the Arab Group were among those opposed to the inclusion
of specific language on transparency measures. 
Although recognising the challenge of multilateral agreements on information exchange, BtB
believed that systematic information exchange and consultation was a critical component for
a successful PoAand recommended its inclusion. Therefore, BtB advocated enhanced
information-exchange and transparency in virtually all of the areas covered in the PoA. It
argued for mechanisms to enhance confidential information exchange amongst governments
and to promote co-operation on issues such as: combating illicit trafficking; marking and
tracing; controlling legal transfers to prevent diversion, destabilising flows, or misuse;
stockpile security; and collection and destruction of SALW. BtB also proposed enhanced
provision of public information. 
These areas identified, at present, are characterised by excessive secrecy which limits the
potential for cooperation amongst all sections of society (government, parliament, NGOs,
industry and citizens) as well as between governments. For example, BtB argued that the
scope of the UN Register for Conventional Arms should be extended at least to include light
weapons such as rocket and grenade launchers, light mortars, heavy machine guns and
shoulder-fired missiles. In addition, specific international transparency arrangements for small
arms should be developed, encouraging systematic information exchange on matters such as
laws, policies and measures. BtB endorsed including explicit encouragement for regional and
international arrangements relating to information exchange and enhanced transparency on
SALW. 
In the event, however, transparency provisions were significantly weakened or completely
eliminated in the final document. The preamble, paragraph 16, of the first draft PoA30
established that “enhanced openness and transparency and improved information
exchange… would contribute greatly to confidence-building and security among States
including a better understanding of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.” 31
Furthermore, Section II, paragraph 26, called on States to “make public, or submit to relevant
regional and international organizations, relevant information” relating to the manufacture,
trade, transport of SALW. 32
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However, none of these provisions remained intact. In the final document there is no mention
of information exchange and transparency in the preamble. It is not mentioned in any detail
until Section III, paragraph 1, which states that: “States need close international cooperation
to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.” 33 In addition, many measures have been
made voluntary, qualified ‘as appropriate’, or left sufficiently vague. For example, the UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN DDA) is called on to collate and circulate “data and
information provided by States on a voluntary basis” (Section II, paragraph 33).34 However,
experience shows that this is unlikely to stimulate much additional information exchange.
Unless States systematise what information is expected to be regularly reported, information
exchange is likely to remain limited and ad-hoc. Under the relevant section in the PoA, the UN
DDAhas little authorisation to remind and encourage states to provide useful information.
Furthermore, the UN DDA has only limited resources to manage and promote such
information exchange, and the PoAcalls on this role to be played ‘within existing resources.’
Without systematic information exchange and consultation it is difficult to see how some of the
other provisions within the PoAcan be effectively implemented. For example, in operationalising
marking and tracing systems to enable governments to trace sources of illicit arms. It is also
d i fficult to see how national coordination agencies and national points of contact (liasing between
States) will improve the situation in many affected countries without exchanges of experience and
information. However, in the absence of such agreements, States should, at a minimum, provide
information to the UN DDA and encourage others to do likewise, while strengthening and
supporting information sharing measures in relevant regional or multilateral arrangements. 
The importance of weapons collection and destruction programmes in removing “surplus”
SALW from both post-conflict situations and societies at peace, and thus in combating
recycling and misuse of these weapons, was highlighted throughout the UN Small Arms
Conference. BtB made a number of recommendations for best practice in the development
and implementation of weapons collection programmes. At the heart of these is the premise
that encouraging civilians and ex-combatants to give up their weapons requires the factors
driving the demand for SALW to be comprehensively addressed. Accordingly, respect for
human rights, the existence of a stable peace, and the ability of governments to assure the
security of civilians will be important prerequisites for any successful weapons collection
programme. Beyond this, BtB argued that the removal of weapons from society must be
reinforced by:
l appropriate legislation that restricts access to SALW on the part of civilians; 
l effective controls on government-owned stocks of SALW to prevent leakage into the illicit
market; and
l legal and operational measures (including strengthened customs and border controls) to
block new supplies of illicit weapons. 
The possibility of providing rewards to communities for surrendering illicit weapons and the
primacy of ensuring speedy destruction of all collected SALW were also highlighted.
BtB recommendations for the UN Small Arms Conference PoAurged the explicit
acknowledgement of the role of weapons collection in post-conflict peace-building and in
tackling violent crime, and called for a clear commitment by States to promote and support
weapons collection in post-conflict regions and regions where SALW proliferation is a
problem. States were further urged to agree to exchange information and build upon best
practice in weapons collection as well as to identify and facilitate the provision of technical
and financial assistance for the implementation of such initiatives.
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The PoAcontains a voluntary commitment to submit information on SALW confiscated or
destroyed to relevant regional and international organisations in Section II, paragraph 2335,
and in Section III, paragraph 14, urges that States “in a position to do so should provide
assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks or unmarked or
inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.” 36 The importance of weapons collection
programmes as a tool for reducing levels of illicit small arms in circulation is not explicitly
recognised, although in Section II, paragraph 20, the public destruction of surplus weapons
and the voluntary surrender of SALW in co-operation with civil society and non-governmental
organisations is encouraged.37 Beyond this, the most critical weakness is that there is no clear
commitment by States to ensure that seized or collected SALW are destroyed, with the
possibility that “another form of disposition or use” may be “officially authorised” (Section II,
paragraph 16).38 The “effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms” is
raised in the context of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes in Section
II, paragraph 21, however, the possibility of “another form of disposition or use” is again
raised.39
Whilst the PoAendorses and encourages weapons collection it does not go beyond this to
recommend or establish any specific programme or mechanisms to promote implementation.
This was perhaps a missed opportunity, and these need to be established as a priority in the
follow-on. Although highlighted during opening day ceremonies by the governments of the
Netherlands, the UK, Brazil and Mali, among others, the UN Small Arms Conference was
unable to address some of the most crucial factors driving the demand for illicit SALW and fell
short of an unequivocal commitment to destroy seized and collected SALW. The role of
weapons collection programmes in post-conflict environments and in the context of
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes is, however, clearly recognised.
States should follow up on this by ensuring that all future UN and other international and
regional peacekeeping missions and demobilisation programmes have at their core the
collection and destruction of weapons. Moreover, whilst the PoAmay allow for recycling of
seized, surplus and collected SALW, all States undertaking such programmes should ensure
that a norm of destruction is established through practice.
Measures to reduce ‘surplus’ stocks of SALW, including ammunition, are widely recognised to
be an essential part of any effective action programme to prevent and reduce illicit trafficking
and proliferation and misuse of small arms. Closely linked with this are programmes to
promote destruction of confiscated or surplus weapons. In this context, ‘surplus’ weapons are
serviceable or unserviceable SALW held in stockpiles by military or police forces or other such
bodies that are surplus to requirements, or illicit weapons that have been seized or confiscated. 
BtB proposed that the UN Small Arms Conference establish a norm of destruction for SALW
that were no longer needed, and that States undertake the responsible and expeditious
disposal of surplus SALW, normally through destruction. In addition, BtB also encouraged
States to agree that SALW transfers should include understandings about the disposal and
destruction of arms rendered surplus by the transfer, and proposed the development of
regional and international mechanisms to enhance cooperation and provide assistance in the
destruction of confiscated and surplus SALW. 
The PoAincludes important commitments in this regard. Section II, paragraph 18, commits
States “to regularly review… stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces,
police and other authorized bodies, and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent
national authorities to be surplus to requirements, are clearly identified”, and furthermore, 
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that “programmes for responsible disposal, preferably by destruction, of such stocks are
established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until
disposal.” 40 It also asserts that SALW should be destroyed, taking into account internationally
recognised destruction methods (Section II, paragraph 19).41 The PoAalso “encourages,
where appropriate, public destruction of surplus weapons,” including in “conflict and post-
conflict situations” (Section II, paragraph 20).42 Furthermore, Section III, paragraph 14, states
that: “Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organisations in a
position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of
surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.” 43
The European Union, amongst others, tried to include in the PoAsome illustrative criteria for
relevant national authorities to take into account when determining whether arms stockpiles
are surplus to requirements. However, this proposal proved to be unacceptable to a number
of countries, which were sensitive to anything that might imply that such a determination was
not solely a matter for individual national governments to decide, based upon their own
situation. Nevertheless, the PoA establishes clear international norms and standards on which
to build. The challenge now is to translate such norms and standards into programmes which
will facilitate and resource effective national and regional implementation. In practice, many
armed forces are unprofessional in their approach to excess arms holdings and confused
about whether older weapons are surplus or need to be held in reserve. Programmes to
encourage a responsible and realistic identification of surplus are needed. Moreover, there is
still a long way to go in the development of regional and international programmes to assist
with timely and effective destruction. 
The UN Small Arms Conference confirmed the importance of measures to ensure that there
are adequate safeguards to prevent the loss of SALW from official or authorised stocks through
theft, corruption or neglect. Losses from military or police stocks, for example, are a major
source of illicit or destabilising arms in many countries. BtB identified information exchange as
a prime requirement for effective stockpile security and recommended that a process of
information exchange, including on practice in stockpile management, be established. 
Section II, paragraph 17, of the PoAcommits States to ensure that “the armed forces, police
or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and
detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of
these weapons.” 44 It goes on to elaborate some of the safeguards which these standards and
procedures should encompass, including: 
l appropriate locations for stockpiles;
l physical security measures; 
l control of access to stocks; 
l inventory management and accounting control; 
l staff training; 
l security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or
authorised personnel; and 
l procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss. 
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At the regional level, the PoAalso states that measures should be taken “to promote safe,
effective stockpile management and security” and “to implement, where appropriate, regional
and sub-regional mechanisms in this regard” (Section II, paragraph 29).45 Section III,
paragraph 6, also states that capacity-building assistance should be made available, on
request, to assist States with ensuring good stockpile management and security. Furthermore,
Section III, paragraph 8 states, “Regional and international programmes for specialist training
on small arms stockpile management and security should be developed [and], upon request,
States and appropriate international or regional organisations in a position to do so should
support these programmes… [while] the United Nations… and other appropriate international
or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this area.” 46
The PoAtherefore goes as far as it usefully could to establish international norms and
encourage programmes to promote secure stockpile management for SALW. The fact that
consensus in this area was achieved without much difficulty reflects substantial progress: only
a few years ago, arms stockpile management was generally regarded as an internal matter,
outside the scope of international negotiations. However, effective implementation will require
substantial national, regional and international programmes. The immediate challenge is to
develop these so that there is real, urgently needed, progress in reducing losses from
authorised holdings of SALW. 
The PoAacknowledges the importance of effective disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR) programmes for peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Section II
paragraphs 22, 34 and 35 and Section III paragraph 16. Although these provisions remain
somewhat vague, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration provisions within the
PoAwere, on the whole, well supported by the delegations at the conference. In the BtB
briefing on the impact of small arms on children recommendations were made for DDR
programmes.47 In particular, the need to take account of the special needs of children,
particularly girls, and the need to develop and support effective skills training and education
programmes for former child combatants. 
Despite support for DDR measures, a number of concerns did arise. Aconsistent concern
throughout the UN Small Arms Conference was the question of resources in Section III. The
PoAdoes not identify resources for the establishment of DDR programmes in those countries
lacking the resources for effective implementation. Indeed, in Section III, paragraph 16,
“relevant regional and international organizations” are called upon to support “appropriate
programmes” related to DDR “within existing resources” although Section II, paragraph 35,
does “encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider… the inclusions of relevant
provisions for [DDR] in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.” 48 While to
date there has been considerable support for DDR programmes, due to the significant funding
and technical requirements, the failure to develop integrated, coordinated and comprehensive
commitments at the regional and international levels may hinder the development and
implementation of effective DDR programmes. 
Another concern in the PoA relating to DDR is the emphasis on programmes in post-conflict
situations with no reference made to the importance of peacetime programmes. Many States
continue to suffer the problems associated with small arms due to the failure or part-failure to
implement effective DDR programmes once a peace accord has been established. The failure
to carry out such programmes or to complete reintegration can lead to high levels of armed
criminality as a country seeks a return to peace. Both political and financial resources need to
be directed to peacetime DDR programmes in those countries where there has been 
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incomplete DDR and where there is a struggle with insecurity, violence and crime associated
with small arms availability. For example, the provisions for peacetime DDR programmes
could be designed and implemented alongside weapons collection and destruction
programmes outlined in the PoA enhancing feelings of insecurity all-round. The PoA
recognises the issue of children in armed conflict and includes measures to “address the
special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular… their reintegration into civil
society, and their appropriate rehabilitation” (Section II, paragraph 22).49 However, no specific
reference is made to the importance of addressing their specific needs, as well of those of
women, in DDR programmes. These should be addressed at other multilateral occassions, for
example the Special Session on Children, which is examined in Section 4.
The BtB project consistently emphasised the potential and actual role of civil society in
preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms. However, the role of civil
society, particularly non-governmental organisations, in the UN Small Arms Conference
remained unclear until the final Preparatory Committee meeting in March 2001 due to
significant opposition from some governments. In the end, the many NGOs that were
determined to have their voices heard in the UN Small Arms Conference achieved their goal
at least to a limited extent. In addition to many NGO side events and much corridor work, a
morning at the start of the second week of the conference was dedicated to NGO
presentations. Anumber of NGO representatives also formed part of government delegations.
Despite most importantly perhaps, the final document recognises “the important contribution
of civil society including non-governmental organizations and industry… in assisting
governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons in all aspects” (Section I, paragraph 16).50
However, despite final provisions outlining the potential contribution of civil society to
combating the problems associated with SALW, the PoAremains very much State oriented.
The Preamble states: “Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating
and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” (Section I,
paragraph 13).51 Although States are encouraged to “facilitate the appropriate cooperation of
civil society in activities” (Section II, paragraph 40)52 and “undertake to cooperate and to
ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts”(Section III, paragraph 2)53 to
deal with the illicit trade in SALW, there is little definition of how civil society should be
engaged in the actual implementation of the PoAat the national, regional or global levels.
Therefore, while in Section IV, paragraph 2(c), NGOs and civil society are encouraged to
“engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, sub-regional and national
efforts to implement… the PoA” 54, the only clear area where civil society and NGOs have a
determined role is in the development and support of “action-oriented research aimed at
facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the
problems” (Section III, paragraph 18).55 In light of the shortfall in the PoA, and the important
role to be played by civil society, section 4 of this briefing identifies some ways in which the
activities of civil society can be further integrated into State efforts to control SALW.
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BtB recognised the complexity of the task of ensuring that the UN Small Arms Conference
PoAcomplements and reinforces the diverse range of existing regional initiatives.
Nevertheless, BtB argued that this was a crucial aspect of the international PoA and, by
studying a number of regional and inter-regional arrangements, made a series of
recommendations as to how the PoA could both support and learn from existing initiatives.
Regional Efforts Supported by the UN PoA
One aspect which could be applied from the OAS experience in particular – but which is also
relevant in many other contexts – is for the UN PoA to support and encourage ratification and
implementation of legally binding regional instruments to control SALW. Encouragingly the
PoAurges regional “negotiations… with the aim of concluding relevant legally binding
instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and
light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them
(Section II, paragraph 25).” 56
In addition, BtB urged that a substantive commitment be made to the provision of technical and
financial assistance for the implementation of regional initiatives. In this regard, the PoA does
not explicitly call upon States to provide assistance specifically for implementing regional
commitments, however, a range of supporting statements have been made which should assist
in this regard. For example, the PoA requests that States, regional and international
organisations “consider assisting interested States… in building capacities” in a variety of
areas primarily “with a view to facilitating implementation of the PoA(Section III, paragraph
6).” 57 In addition States and international and regional organisations are encouraged to “co-
operate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit
trade in SALW in all its aspects (Section III, paragraph 5). ” 5 8 A c c o r d i n g l y, these and other
provisions for the allocation of assistance should, if implemented fully, have the effect of
facilitating and encouraging implementation of regional SALW initiatives.
Regional Efforts Inform the UN PoA
Whilst pointing to the ways in which the UN PoA could support efforts to tackle SALW
proliferation in the regions, BtB also sought to draw upon regional experiences so as to inform
the scope and development of international commitments. In this regard harmonisation of
licensing procedures (as specified in the OAS Convention)59 should be considered an
important focus for efforts to address the illicit SALW trade. However, whilst calling for the
establishment of “adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise
effective control over the production of SALW… and over the export, import, transit or
retransfer of such weapons” (Section II, paragraph 2), 60 the PoAfails to mention the need for
convergence or harmonisation in such areas or the possibility of developing model
regulations. 
One of the most protracted areas of debate in advance of the UN Small Arms Conference
concerned the issue of criteria for the export of SALW. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms
Exports provides the most comprehensive example of regional agreement in this area with
elaborated criteria, consultation mechanisms and an annual review process. Had the political
will existed amongst States, the EU Code could have been a useful model on which to base
an international agreement. Since some States argued that the focus on the illicit trade in
SALW negated the need to examine this issue, the fact that the PoAdoes address the issue
of export controls on SALW represents an achievement in itself. Nevertheless the undertaking
to “assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and
procedures… consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant
international law” (Section II, paragraph 11) represents a starting point for the development of
international controls in this area upon which States should seek to build.61
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An important aspect of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and
Manufacture of Light Weapons and the associated PCASED process is the explicit
recognition of how insecurity and the proliferation of SALW undermine development.62 It is
encouraging, therefore, to note that the preamble of the PoArecognises the role that poverty
and underdevelopment can play in fuelling the illicit trade in SALW, and that this is
substantiated in Section III, paragraph 17, in which States are urged to “make greater efforts
to address problems related to human and sustainable development.” 63 Furthermore, the PoA
also explicitly endorses and recommends the ECOWAS approach by calling for the
“strengthening and establishing… of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or sub
regions on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons… and to respect
such moratoria… and co-operate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof,
including through technical assistance and other measures” (Section II, paragraph 26).64
In terms of inter-regional co-operation, BtB noted a number of aspects of the EU-SADC
arrangement that could inform and help substantiate the PoA, including the need for synergy
between political and operational agencies in tackling the illicit trade in SALW. In this regard it
is encouraging to note that the PoA urges States to “enhance co-operation, the exchange of
experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and
arms control officials at the national, regional and global levels (Section III, paragraph 7).” 65
However, there are other aspects of the EU-SADC approach that are not addressed by the
PoA. For example the need for domestic regulation of SALW ownership is clearly articulated
in the Southern Africa Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking, but provisions
for addressing civilian possession of SALW remains one of the most notable and serious
omissions from the PoA.66
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The PoAadopted at the UN Small Arms Conference represents a first step towards
international, co-ordinated action to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and
light weapons. Global conferences, such as the UN Small Arms Conference, represent a
universal response to problems that transcend national borders. The UN Small Arms
Conference was an important effort towards mobilising political and public support for
combating SALW and for international action to tackle the proliferation and misuse of these
weapons. The conference agreed on a range of valuable politically binding commitments,
though it stopped short of launching negotiations for specific international instruments.
Proposals for a system of both UN and ad hoc mechanisms to implement the PoAwere
mooted in the first draft programme, after meeting opposition from many quarters. Some
countries resisted giving too much authority to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs
under such a broad mandate. Others opposed the creation of micro-bureaucracies within the
UN system. While some were cautious about the financial implications of formalised
mechanisms. The result was a move to the other extreme, in which most of the operational
implementation of the PoAis left to States, which may voluntarily report to the UN DDAon
steps taken to implement the PoA.
The PoAcalls for the following concrete follow-up measures:
l AReview Conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation
of the PoA;
l Biennial Meetings of States to consider national, regional and global implementation of the
PoA; and
l AUN feasibility study of developing an international instrument to identify and trace illicit SALW.
The PoAalso includes a set of voluntary measures for States to take to support the
implementation of the PoA and to further international cooperation, including to:67
l cooperate and ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with
the illicit trade in SALW and encourage partnerships, including with civil society;
l provide technical and financial assistance and support efforts to build capacity to further
the implementation of measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW
contained in the PoA;
l develop specialist training on SALW stockpile management and security and provide
support for these programmes, including developing UN capacity for training;
l use and support, including by providing information, the Interpol International Weapons
and Explosives Tracking System or other databases;
l consider international cooperation and assistance to examine technologies to improve the
tracing and detection of the illicit trade in SALW;
l cooperate in tracing SALW, particularly by strengthening mechanisms based on
information exchange, including national systems for marking SALW;
l provide assistance for destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus SALW or
unmarked or inadequately marked SALW;
l support DDR programmes; 
l develop and support action-oriented research;
l provide information on a voluntary basis to the UN DDAon implementation of the PoA with
the information to be collated and circulated by the UN DDA; and 
l develop a common understanding of the basic issues and the scope of the problems
related to the illicit brokering of SALW.
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Section 2: Follow-up to the UN Small Arms Conference
and Implementation of the Programme of Action 
Aclear challenge to the uniform implementation of the PoAis the onus that has been placed
upon action at the national level, with few specific areas earmarked for regional or global
action. Calls for more specificity in the PoA, on a time-frame for implementation, and a series
of benchmarks against which to measure implementation, did not achieve wide support or
remain a priority in the follow-up. However, as the President of the Conference, H.E. Mr.
Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, noted, the PoA represents a road map for actions, objectives and
purposes, based on agreed recommendations that leaves space for those willing to go faster
or slower in the implementation of the PoA.68 Yet, this said, it will be important to ensure that
all States remain on this road and make good progress in implementing the commitments in
the PoA. The following discussion outlines a number of crucial opportunities for encouraging
and monitoring this progress.
The First Committee of the UN General Assembly debated a resolution on the UN Small Arms
Conference (A/C.1/56/L.47) that gives form to some of the follow-up measures contained in
the PoA. The resolution, sponsored by 57 countries from Africa, the Americas, Asia and
Europe (but excluding China, Russia, the UK and the USA) calls for the following steps:
l a Review Conference by 2006 with the date and venue to be decided in 2003;
l the first Biennial Meeting of States in 2003 to consider national, regional and global
implementation of the PoA;
l a UN study to examine the feasibility of an international instrument to enable States to
identify and trace illicit SALW to be completed in 2003;
l consideration of further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing,
combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW in 2002; 
l destruction of surplus, confiscated or collected SALW with States reporting to the UN the
types and quantities destroyed and the methods of destruction; and
l to ensure that the UN Secretariat has the necessary resources and expertise to promote
the implementation of the PoA.
In August 2001, a few weeks after the end of the UN Small Arms Conference, the UN Security
Council held an open debate on the issue of small arms. While many of the statements made
on behalf of governments resembled those made the previous month, the fact that the debate
occurred and helped sustain the profile of the issue is important in its own right. 
UN General
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Section 2: Follow-up to the UN Small Arms Conference
and Implementation of the Programme of Action 
The PoAagreed at the UN Small Arms Conference establishes a key set of principles,
obligations and measures to which all participating States are committed. In spite of the
widely differing perspectives between countries and regions on priorities in preventing and
reducing illicit trafficking and proliferation of SALW that were manifest at the conference, the
agreed PoAprovides a ‘floor’ of minimum standards and obligations that every country and
region should adopt and pursue. Beyond these, States and regions are encouraged to take
further and more stringent measures according to their specific priorities and situation. 
The follow-up mechanisms adopted by States in the PoA do, nevertheless, provide a means
of building greater support for global, coordinated approaches through the Biennial Meetings
and the first Review Conference. Indeed, the President of the conference advanced the
suggestion that the Review Conference in 2006 be viewed as a deadline to accomplish the
PoA, with the Biennial Meetings of States as instruments to exchange information and review
progress at national and regional levels.69
BtB is clear on the need for concrete, measurable mechanisms to control and monitor SALW
being agreed in the coming years, with progress reviews at the Biennial Meetings of States. In
the first BtB briefing, issues were identified where it was judged there was greater potential for
agreement by the time of a Review Conference. Whilst commitments in all of these areas fall
short of what the BtB project recommended, individual States or groups of States must take
the lead in ensuring that progress is made in developing and implementing the provisions of
the PoAin each of these areas. The Biennial Meetings and Review Conference represent
crucial opportunities to assess progress in addressing these issues and for encouraging
action on the part of more reluctant States that are falling or lagging behind. 
Additional measures, such as regulating ammunition and explosives or addressing the factors
underlying the demand for weapons, were seen as more complex problems, requiring greater
debate and consideration. Debate on these issues, however, should be part of the
international discourse on SALW in the coming years with a view to including them in a
strengthened PoA in 2006. 
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Section 3: Funding and Resourcing the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action 
and Promoting International Assistance
In recent years, at the UN and elsewhere, governments have made commitments to
cooperate and assist each other in preventing and combating illicit arms trafficking and the
associated problems. However, the commitments have often been vague and involved little
real policy and institutional change, and most importantly have often lacked adequate funding
and resourcing. As a result political will and capacity, as well as practical cooperation, have
generally been inadequate. 
Similarly the UN Small Arms Conference PoAmakes only minimal provision for funding of
activities for its implementation. The UN is required to fund the feasibility study on tracing and
to use available resources to circulate information provided by States on implementation of the
P o A on an annual basis. Beyond these sparse provisions, the implementation of the PoA r e s t s
on voluntary funding, either through the UN and its agencies, for example the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), or through individual countries or regional organisations. 
In view of the myriad of challenges facing governments seeking to control the proliferation of
and illicit trade in SALW at national, regional and global levels, a major increase in available
funding will be required from all States and organisations in a position to contribute. Whilst
many governments have modest budget lines dedicated to addressing small arms proliferation,
the scale of the SALW problem will undoubtedly require accessing the more substantial funds
located within security, defence and development budgets of more affluent States. There have
been positive developments in this regard. The governments of Japan and the United Kingdom
made public their plans to support the implementation of the PoA during the UN Small Arms
Conference and other key donor countries plan also to direct funding for SALW activities in
support of the implementation of the PoAeither directly or indirectly.
In this context, BtB believes that there are three main tasks in enhancing international
assistance in implementing the PoA:
l identifying the needs and priorities for assistance;
l mobilising resources for effective international assistance; and
l matching identified needs with resources available for assistance.
Each country and region needs to develop its own programmes of work to implement the
PoA, and to identify those areas where it requires assistance. Whilst there are many areas
where assistance would be useful, priorities need to be established in order to help direct
assistance to the most critical efforts.
In practice some countries, including some of those most severely affected by small arms
proliferation, will need assistance in the process of preparing their plans and programmes of
work, and in arranging the consultations required to identify priorities and needs. The
processes of developing programmes of action, and identifying needs, should in many areas
take place at a regional and sub-regional as well as national and provincial level. Experiences
in Europe, Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa have already begun to
demonstrate the value of such approaches. 
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Section 3: Funding and Resourcing the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action 
and Promoting International Assistance
Donor governments, and relevant international and regional donor organisations and
agencies, have to ensure they develop the capacity to provide appropriate assistance to help
promote implementation of the PoA. This remains a major challenge. It means ensuring that
they have the budget lines to provide such assistance, and the institutional capacity to provide
such assistance in a timely and flexible way.
Nationally, in donor countries, development agencies typically have programme guidelines
and institutional constraints that need to be reformed or expanded if they are to provide
appropriate assistance in implementing the PoA on small arms. Development budgets have
often been considered the most appropriate source of funding. However, the scope and
complexity of the small arms problem, as well as the PoA, requires other budgets to be
examined and accessed. For example, in many cases defence or national security budgets
may also be more appropriate, especially in relation to technical cooperation, weapons
destruction and security sector reform.
Similarly there is still a long way to go in developing the capacity of international and regional
donor organisations to assist in the implementation of the PoA. Whilst UNDP has recently
made substantial progress in this respect, and is now developing a useful and comprehensive
programme of assistance in this area, this cannot yet be said of other organisations such as
the World Bank. Government representatives on the governing boards of organisations such
as the World Bank need to take measures to ensure that these institutions reform and
develop programmes that provide appropriate assistance to governments intent on
implementing the PoA.
One key issue in developing capacity to provide assistance in this area is to ensure that donor
institutions have the capacity to provide flexible and timely funding across a substantial range
of the areas addressed in the Programme of Action. There has been a tendency in some
agencies to develop narrow and constrained budget lines, making them relatively incapable of
actually meeting the appropriate needs of the recipient countries and communities. This may
require further examination possibly with NGOs working in this field.
Experience shows that it is no easy task to achieve necessary matching of needs with resources
available for assistance, and the effective coordination of donor assistance. In principle, it is
best for the recipient government or region to coordinate donor assistance, particularly when
funds are emanating from a number of different sources. In practice, however, this is often
difficult, and the donor community itself also has a major responsibility to ensure appropriate
coordination. The immediate priority, in itself a challenging task, is to ensure at least effective
information exchange and consultation amongst donors and their partners. No single mechanism
or organisation can do it reliably. The main principle should therefore be to ensure multiple
channels for information exchange and consultation to facilitate coordination of assistance. 
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Section 3: Funding and Resourcing the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action 
and Promoting International Assistance
Firstly, international and regional information exchange and consultation mechanisms need to
be developed. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development
Co-operation Directorate (OECD DAC) could play an important role here. The UN Department
of Disarmament Affairs and the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism [CASA]
also have important roles to play, not least in helping to gather and disseminate information
on assistance activities and plans of the various UN agencies, and to assist in the
dissemination of relevant information on wider assistance programmes. The Group of
Interested States has already played a useful role in this respect, and ways should be found
to enhance this role. Regional mechanisms will also be essential, with regional organisations
having a responsibility to allocate resources to this effort.
Secondly, coordination and information exchange of assistance should be organised in the
recipient country or at the regional level. There is ample precedent for this in other issue
areas, but experience shows that it does not take place automatically, but requires active
effort. Interregional cooperation, and meetings such as the meeting of the OECD and African
States planned for March 2002, also make a valuable contribution in this context. 
Thirdly, there is scope for developing consultation and cooperation in assistance through
specific thematic international programmes. Issue areas that are prime candidates for the
development of such programmes include arms stockpile security, weapons collection,
weapons destruction and enhancing customs and border controls. Athematic programme
could include specific mechanisms to exchange experiences and resources for assistance in
that specific area. Some pooling of resources, through international resource centres, could
make a major contribution. 
Finally, all countries and organisations providing assistance have a responsibility to be
sufficiently transparent and open to cooperation to facilitate appropriate coordination. 
This applies to governments and international and regional organisations but also to NGOs
and other civil society contributors. This may require further examination possibly with NGOs
working in this field. 
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Section 4: Outcomes and the Way Forward
The PoAagreed at the UN Small Arms Conference provides a key set of agreed principles,
commitments and programmes that all participating States should implement. Clearly different
States and regional groupings will implement these according to their own situations and
capabilities. However, even in the months since the conclusion of the UN Small Arms
Conference a number of regional initiatives to tackle SALW proliferation and misuse have
begun to develop. 
EU Region
The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted on 25th May 1998. The
Code was drawn upon during the UN Small Arms Conference, in particular, for efforts to
control brokering. At the start of the UN Small Arms Conference, the Belgian Foreign Minister,
on behalf of the EU, declared: “Brokering is a major problem in the context of illicit trade in
small arms. For this reason we consider a legally binding instrument to be necessary here as
well. Nor should transport and financing be forgotten.” 70 In November 2001, the Third EU
Code Annual Report suggested provisions for the regulation of arms brokering activities.71
These included: 
l the requirement of a government license for arms brokering and mediation activities. 
All such applications to be assessed on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of the
EU Code; and
l that Member States seriously consider registering brokers or requiring them to obtain a
written authorization from the Member States where they are resident or established.
Whilst such controls are not legally binding, all EU states are expected to implement them
and therefore, these guidelines are an important step towards the development and
harmonisation of such controls within the EU region. It is to be hoped, moreover, that the
lessons learned from the EU deliberations on the brokering issue can be spread
internationally through the Biennial Meeting and Review Conference process leading to the
eventual realisation of the goal of an international legally binding instrument. 
OSCE Region
The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the OSCE adopted the OSCE Document on
Small Arms and Light Weapons on the 24th November 2000. While the Document is a
statement of political commitment, rather than a legally binding instrument, it has
considerable importance. The 56 OSCE participating States account for just over half of the
w o r l d ’s legal exporters of small arms including three of the four biggest exporters – the US,
the Russian Federation, and Germany. Many OSCE countries – especially in Central A s i a ,
the Caucasus, and South Eastern Europe – are also affected by the problem of small arms
proliferation, availability and misuse.
Much of the importance of the Document relates to its comprehensive nature, which aims to
combat illicit SALW trafficking in all its aspects. There is a strong focus on improving controls
over legal manufacture and transfer, with provision made for marking, record keeping, and the
harmonisation of import, export and in-transit procedures and documentation. The Document
also contains provisions for the regulation of international arms brokers and recommended
criteria to be used in determining export licence applications. 
Furthermore, in adopting the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE
States agreed to provide assistance for stockpile management, weapons collection, and
border control, and to incorporate small arms related measures into future OSCE missions
and peacekeeping operations. They also agreed to exchange information on various aspects
of their policies and procedures related to SALW. These exchanges of information took place
on 30th June 2001 but further submissions have been received through January 2002. 
Regional
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An overview of the first OSCE information exchange on SALW was published on 23rd
January 2002 by the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE Secretariat. It covered national
marking systems, national procedures for the control of manufacture, national legislation and
current practice on export policy, control over international arms brokering, and techniques for
the destruction of SALW.
South Eastern Europe and the Stability Pact
The publication of the comprehensive OSCE Document on Small Arms in November 2000,
and a series of government and NGO-sponsored seminar events in the Balkan sub-region
linked to the UN Small Arms Conference and Prep Com process together provided the
catalyst for substantive progress on the small arms problem in the Balkan region. These
efforts crystallised when, in August 2001, the Office of the Coordinator of the Stability Pact
produced a draft Regional Implementation Plan (RIP) for South Eastern Europe. The RIP
provides for action across a range of small arms related concerns, including action to: 
l prevent and combat illicit trafficking; 
l support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; 
l enhance the role of the security sector in tackling small arms proliferation; 
l promote transparency and accountability; 
l enhance public awareness; 
l improve legislative capacity; and 
l support the collection and disposal of small arms. 
Other important components include provision for the establishment of a Regional Clearing
House for SALW reduction in Belgrade, under UNDP auspices, that will provide advice on
formulating proposals and implementing small arms projects and facilitate the sharing of
information. Also envisaged is a Regional Steering Group consisting of national focal points
from each country which will be charged with monitoring the implementation of the RIP and
reviewing priorities for action. In order to support these processes, a special fund will be
established to which donors will be encouraged to contribute.
In practical terms, the RIP seeks to enhance regional co-operation on small arms and light
weapons, and to create a framework within which donors can work closely with countries in
South Eastern Europe on joint programmes to implement the OSCE Document, UN PoA and
other relevant commitments. In recognition of the valuable role of the partnership with civil
society in its implementation, it was agreed with the Office of the Co-ordinator of the Stability
Pact that the Plan would be presented to participants at a seminar in Szeged, Hungary, in
September 2001 as part of an ongoing consultation process. 
At the seminar it was agreed that the civil society-led Szeged Small Arms Process should play
a ‘complimentary and reinforcing role’ in assisting the effective implementation of the plan and
that this should include: 
l reviewing and monitoring implementation; 
l raising public awareness; 
l mobilising political will in support of the Plan; and 
l developing supplementary initiatives such as youth projects and police-community dialogue.
Regional
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OAS Region
During the UN Small Arms Conference, the parties to the Inter-American Convention Against
the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other
Related Materials took advantage of the conference to bolster support for the Convention and
its implementation. On 11 July 2001 the representative of the Government of Mexico, as chair
of the Convention’s Consultative Committee, made a presentation to the UN Small Arms
Conference on behalf of the Rio Group. In the days following this presentation, the chair met
with the UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Director of the UN
Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean (UN-LiREC) and representatives of the EU to discuss future modes of cooperation. 
These meetings and the apparent political will to move forward in a collaborative fashion
builds on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between UN DDAand the OAS
on 26 January 2001, which set out a legal framework for cooperation with regard to measures
to reduce illegal trafficking in firearms in the region. UN-LiREC and CICAD, which were
already established as the respective implementing institutions of this agreement prior to the
UN Small Arms Conference, have already begun to develop multilateral technical cooperation
in relation to the CICAD Model Regulations. In 2000 and 2001 UN-LiREC, in cooperation with
CIDAD, held Model Regulation awareness-building workshops in Peru, Martinique and
Trinidad and Tobago open to all UN Member States in Latin America, including Cuba, which
remains excluded from participation in the OAS. These seminars are scheduled to continue
into 2002. 
Following the UN Small Arms Conference, in November 2001, the Government of Chile and
UN-LiREC held a regional follow-up seminar for the Latin American and Caribbean States
together with selected NGOs. There was widespread participation in the seminar which
explored further the OAS Inter-American Convention and CICAD/OAS Model Regulations as
well as issues as varied as arms cultures, police and customs capacity, and the role of civil
society in addressing arms proliferation, availability and misuse. From February 2002, the EU,
together with the Governments of the Netherlands and Sweden, have agreed to finance
related training activities on a sub-regional level for police and customs officers involving UN-
LiREC, CICAD and potentially INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, thereby
facilitating implementation of important PoAcommitments relating to cooperation and
information and resource-sharing between such offices and officials.
These activities represent important progress in the implementation of commitments in the
UN PoA for the establishment of adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures
to control the production, export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW. 
ECOWAS Region
On 31 October 1998, the 16 Heads of State in the Economic Community of West Africa
(ECOWAS) declared a three-year Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and
Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Moratorium, which was agreed in order
to reduce the proliferation, circulation and misuse of these weapons in West Africa, led to the
adoption of a plan of action and code of conduct. A Program for Coordination and Assistance
on Security and Development (PCASED) is currently being implemented in the region to
address the security and development problems associated with the proliferation and misuse
of these weapons and to help reinforce the politically-binding Moratorium commitments.
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initiatives
30
Section 4: Outcomes and the Way Forward
At the start of the UN Small Arms Conference, the permanent representative of Mali informed
the President of the UN Security Council, in a letter dated 9th July 2001, that the Heads of
State of ECOWAS had decided to renew the Moratorium for a second three-year period with
effect from 5 July 2001. While the Moratorium is an important mechanism for addressing the
problems associated with these weapons, for this initiative to be fully translated into effective
action on the ground, the international community and especially donor governments need to
coordinate supporting measures for the ECOWAS Moratorium and PCASED process.
Furthermore, it is imperative that greater monitoring of the Moratorium is undertaken and that
it be fully respected by all States within and outside the region. 
Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa
In Eastern Africa, progress has continued since the UN Small Arms Conference to implement
the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light
Weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, which was signed in March 2000
by Foreign Ministers from 10 countries. Alegal protocol on small arms control that seeks to
strengthen and harmonise national legislation across the region has been agreed by the legal
sub-committee of the Eastern African Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO) and was presented
to the annual meeting of police chiefs in September 2001. It now awaits final approval by
national governments. Further to this a regional seminar of senior government officials and
police experts was held in Djibouti in December 2001. Participants agreed a series of
practical steps to support the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration in the following
specific areas: 
l establishing national focal points (NFPs – inter-agency bodies to coordinate the work of
different government departments on small arms control); 
l adopting the legal protocol on small arms control; and 
l responsibility in managing stockpiles of small arms and in collecting and destroying
surplus small arms.
Progress has been made at the national level with the establishment of NFPs in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda. The first task for these bodies is to develop a national implementation
plan on SALW. Tanzania has been the first country to have successfully completed a
comprehensive national mapping exercise and a five-year plan to tackle the proliferation of
small arms for which funds are being sought. In Kenya, a UN assessment team led by the
UN DDA has visited the country to assess the nature and extent of the small arms problem.
This made a number of recommendations for national and regional steps that could be taken
and the UN is now planning to hold a regional meeting 
for the heads of NFPs.
It is clearly important that such regional initiatives, which have been and will likely remain o n e
of the main mechanisms whereby the PoA is implemented at national and regional level, are
nurtured, assisted and reinforced by the international community where this is possible and
appropriate. To facilitate this, an international engagement framework is required to ensure
that these divergent activities are developed in complementary and synergistic ways. Such a
framework should also ensure that the limited national and international resources available,
from governments, NGOs and the international donor community, are targeted in the most
effective manner possible. This will help promote sustainable solutions and prevent wasteful
duplication. 
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The diverse problems associated with small arms ensure that any effective solution requires
a multi-sectoral approach. Therefore, while the national and regional initiatives outlined above
are key to tackling the problems of these weapons, there are other cross cutting issues and
processes that will affect or be affected by the implementation of the PoA.
UN Special Session on Children
The UN Special Session on Children, originally scheduled to take place in September 2001
but now postponed until May 2002, will be an important opportunity to highlight the impacts of
small arms on children as well as to develop a strong international response that builds upon
the outcomes of the UN Small Arms Conference. In this regard, it is important that
governments consider the effects of small arms not only in the context of discussions on
armed conflict, but also recognise the impact of these weapons on children living in non-
conflict situations. BtB recommended a framework that united the priorities of those working
on children and those working on small arms to enable the development of common
approaches for reducing the negative impact of small arms on children. Some of these
recommendations found their way into the UN Small Arms PoA. However, the current draft
outcome document for the UN Special Session, “A World Fit for Children”, contains only one
reference to the dangers of small arms proliferation and misuse. It is vital that the effects of
SALW in all contexts are included throughout the document and that the international
community uses this opportunity to build appropriate responses to address small arms
proliferation, availability and misuse as it affects children.
UN Firearms Protocol
While multilateral efforts to curb small arms proliferation and misuse are still relatively new
and untested, the law enforcement approach to the problem with its focus on combating illicit
weapons trafficking has garnered widespread support by governments, culminating in the
negotiation of the UN Protocol against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their
Parts and Components and Ammunition. The Protocol, supplementary to the UN Convention
on Trans-national Organised Crime, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 May
2001. The Protocol is a legally binding treaty that commits States to inter alia:
l promote common international standards for the import, export and in-transit international
movement of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;
l encourage cooperation and information exchange at the national, regional and global
levels, including on firearms identification, tracking and tracing; and
l further international cooperation on firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition
by developing an international regime for the management of commercial shipments.
Governments should now ratify this Protocol at the earliest possible opportunity and work to
ensure that it is fully implemented. Encouragingly, a number of sub-regions – including
Southern and Eastern Africa – have been working to develop their own specific Protocols on
Firearms and Ammunition, which in many respects go further than the UN agreement. These
efforts should be supported by the international community and, whenever possible,
replicated in other regions.
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multilateral
issues
32
Section 4: Outcomes and the Way Forward
Events and Attitudes post-11 September 2001
A factor that must now be considered is the shift in the SALW control paradigm following the
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent initiation of a “war on terrorism”.
The full effects of this shift cannot yet be determined. Following the attacks, government
leaders publicly acknowledged the importance of combating the illicit trade in small arms in
the broader fight against terrorism. This acceptance may allow for a re-visiting of issue
areas, such as international controls on arms brokers and a norm prohibiting the supply of
S A LW to non-governmental entities, that proved too controversial for consensus at the UN
Small Arms Conference but which are crucial for combating the supply of SALW to terrorist
groups. 
Conversely, there are also concerns that the political compromises and the necessities of
realpolitik caused by the establishment of a broad based governmental “coalition against
terrorism” could potentially lead to the weakening of State to State SALW export controls in
particular, and in general, a greater willingness to turn a blind eye to violations of other
aspects of international law – such as international human rights standards and international
humanitarian law – on the part of those States who are seen to be proactive in combating
terrorism. It is crucial, however, that international legal standards relating to the transfer and
use of SALW are upheld at all costs.
Acrucial element in effective implementation of the UN Small Arms PoAis the establishment
of a mechanism (or mechanisms) for systematic exchange of information and experience
between regional, sub-regional and international bodies involved in efforts to prevent and
reduce SALW proliferation and misuse. As mentioned above, one forum for such exchange
and development of best practice would be the Biennial Meetings of States/Review
Conference process. Another focus for such progress could be the established sub-regional,
regional and multilateral organisations, which should be encouraged to include SALW control
issues on their agenda.
An alternative methodology would be the establishment of broad-based international expert
groups focused on the development of specific SALW policy areas. In this regard, BtB is
investigating the possibility of convening independent groups of government, UN and NGO
experts to develop policy proposals for implementing and developing key commitments in the
PoA and to identify new areas for action. Akey function of these groups would be to bring real
practical expertise into policy discussions so as to ensure that outcomes are based on best
practice and, at the same time, reflective of the realities on the ground. It is envisaged that
these expert groups would also utilise military, security and other technical experts, as well as
leading local practitioners and regional experts, who would have a primary role to play.
There are a number of key issue areas where such a process could be of benefit and be the
catalyst for a quantum jump in the development and implementation of international policy
and action. Such issue areas include: 
l controlling arms brokering; 
l international transparency mechanisms for small arms; 
l developing and elaborating on what constitute States “existing responsibilities under
relevant international law” relating to small arms transfers; and
l stockpile management techniques and how to build capacity in this area in affected countries. 
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The exact focus of such expert groups would be defined in consultation with members of the
target audience, whilst the specific aims of each would depend on the issue under discussion.
The conclusions and recommendations of such expert groups would be tailored to feed into
the UN debate, as well as that of other relevant multilateral organisations, however, it is
anticipated that each group will recommend a process for promoting adoption and
implementation of their conclusions.
The importance of developing a process of thorough monitoring of the PoAimplementation is
three-fold. Firstly, it will show where and how progress is being made on implementing the
PoA– nationally, regionally and internationally – so that this experience can be used to inform
and support efforts in other national and regional contexts. Secondly, it will review the extent
to which relevant expertise and assistance is being provided in order to identify possible gaps
and to facilitate the implementation of commitments at national, regional and international
levels. Thirdly, it will assess progress on the development of international measures to control
SALW in order to highlight those areas which merit increased attention. Whilst such
monitoring needs to be undertaken primarily by governments, civil society can play an
important role by feeding into and complimenting such ongoing governmental evaluation.
In this regard the BtB project is seeking to work with a wide variety of partners to develop
substantial Biennial and Review Conference Reports on progress made by States in the
implementation of key elements of the PoA. These reports will be published in advance,
respectively, of the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference. The reports will
be the result of a qualitative and analytic process involving surveys of particular regional and
national progress towards the implementation of the PoA. Although the reports will not seek to
address the implementation of the PoA in all countries and regions, it is anticipated that over
the three reports, all regions and at least 20 countries will be covered. Such monitoring and
evaluation must occur at the local, national, regional as well as the international levels.
Furthermore, it is important that a mechanism be found to integrate such NGO monitoring into
that undertaken by governments.
The primary responsibility for implementing the PoAand ensuring human security lies with
States. But the UN PoA cannot be effective without the active involvement of all actors for
progressive change and all sections of society. Civil society, particularly the NGO community,
has a crucial role to play. Many governments have already recognised the important role of
NGOs and other sections of civil society. However, in those countries where such mutually
beneficial relationships are inadequate or non-existent, governments should allow space and
take initiatives to develop them. This may require changes of attitude and the development of
habits of openness, consultation and co-operation. The creation of national consultative
mechanisms and procedures may be a means to facilitate this. 
There are a number of key areas where NGOs and civil society can make a vital contribution
towards successful implementation of the PoA and in combating SALW proliferation and
misuse more broadly.
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Awareness raising 
Alerting the public to the devastation wrought by the proliferation and misuse of SALW worldwide
and consequently mobilising support for government initiatives and the PoA implementation is
a crucial NGO activity. Aprimary aim of this awareness-raising work must be to ensure that
the implementation of the PoA is seen as an ongoing long-term process and to ensure that
the public recognises the relevance of this issue to themselves and their communities. In this
regard it is vital that the NGO community ensure that media and wider public interest in this
issue is sustained over the next five years until the 2006 Review Conference. In this regard,
the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) has a crucial role to play (see below). 
Acting as catalysts and intermediaries
NGOs and other civil society organisations (such as faith leaders, trade unions,  women’s
groups and indigenous peoples’ leaders) can play intermediary or bridge-building roles
between the government and certain sectors of society, which may be indifferent or potentially
antagonistic to the government itself, but vital for effective implementation of the PoAat the
local or national levels. The role of the Brazilian NGO, Vivo Rio, working in the barrios of Rio
de Janeiro to build trust between the State and Federal Police and the local communities is a
very good working example which has lead to the development of cooperative projects to
combat small arms proliferation and misuse.
Providing a pool of expertise
Civil society has been intimately involved on the ground in the fight against SALW proliferation
and misuse for many years. Over this period the multitude of diverse grass roots NGO and
civil society organisations have built up a huge store of institutional and individual staff and
activist expertise and skill on successful methodologies required to tackle this complex
problem – ranging from practical micro-disarmament activities, collection and destruction
programmes, public/community education projects against gun violence, DDR initiatives in
post conflict situations to the provision of health care to the victims of gun violence and the
counselling of child soldiers and their victims. Such expertise and human resources are
potentially available to governments to strengthen their ongoing initiatives. Many NGOs would
be willing to work with officials in training and advise to States, if requested. 
Provision of primary research and development of policy
In the run up to and throughout the UN Small Arms Conference process one of the major
contributions provided by civil society was in the research and documentation of the reality of
SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. Arms control/research institutes and NGOs have
detailed all aspects of the illicit SALW cycle from manufacture to transfer and misuse.
Similarly human rights organisations, aid and relief bodies, medical associations, women’s ,
trade union, church, indigenous peoples and other civil society groups have chronicled the
multifaceted deleterious effects of small arms on communities and individuals. In this regard,
the Small Arms Survey, in particular, has played an important role in collating, synthesising,
analysing and presenting such research data. Closely linked, is the work of analytical and
policy orientated NGOs, which have sought to provide new approaches and strategies for
combating SALW proliferation and misuse. By extending public and governmental
understanding of the issue, civil society has played a vital role in alerting the international
community to the problem and enabled it to develop the appropriate response. Now civil
society can use these experiences and skills to promote implementation of the UN PoA.
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Section 4: Outcomes and the Way Forward
The role of IANSA
In all of these activities the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is in a
position to play a pivotal coordinating role. IANSAnow encompasses over 340 NGOs from
over 71 countries across the world working to prevent the proliferation and misuse of SALW.
The network helps co-ordinate activities and campaigning by bringing together a wide range
of organisations such as human rights monitors, relief and development agencies, security
and gun control groups, religious and public health groups. IANSAalso provides an
invaluable framework within which organisations can support and learn from each other.
I A N S A played a crucial role in coordinating NGO and civil society action in the run up to the
UN Small Arms Conference. Following on from this success, IANSA is embarking upon a
multi-year plan of action that will focus both on developing and strengthening regional NGO
networks, and encouraging international action on SALW. Those governments which
recognise the importance of civil society in combating SALW proliferation, availability and
misuse should consider how best to strengthen and support IANSA, as IANSA in turn seeks
to strengthen and support government programmes to implement the PoA. In this regard the
UK government’s substantial funding of IANSAis to be warmly welcomed.
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Conclusion 
BtB urged that the UN Small Arms Conference develop a set of mutually reinforcing
agreements, programmes and measures at all levels – national, regional and international 
– with five critical components. Although the PoAdoes not embody all of these components, 
it does, to varying degrees, recognise their importance. The first element – clarification and
establishment of common definitions and understandings – was addressed, for example, 
in the context of brokering and marking and tracing. The second element – developing, 
coordinating and harmonising national laws policies and practices – is partially addressed in
the context of production, export and transit or retransfer of SALW. However, the importance
of harmonisation is not recognised in important areas such as export authorisation and
marking. The third element – establishing or enhancing information exchange, consultation
and assistance – is an important theme throughout the PoA. It is to be hoped, however, that
the continual emphasis on “voluntary” information exchange does not represent a dilution of
States’ commitment to this process. Fourthly - the development of systems to identify and
respond to problems with implementation and compliance - is not a prominent feature of the
PoA. It is to be hoped that the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference
process will, however, bridge this gap and facilitate monitoring of the implementation of the
PoA. Finally - the establishment of follow-on mechanisms to facilitate further development of
international cooperation - has been explicitly provided for in the fields of SALW brokering (a
commitment to consider further steps to enhance international co-operation) and tracing (a
commitment to undertake a UN study to examine the feasibility of developing an international
instrument). However, these are minimal provisions and it is to be hoped that the overall
commitments and process for following up the PoA will ensure further development of
international action to address the proliferation, availability and misuse of SALW.
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